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Abstract 
 
 
This study investigates whether and how accounting conservatism improves the 
corporate information environment. We argue that conservatism facilitates the flow 
of firm-specific information from corporate insiders to outsiders and leads to a high-
quality information environment. Using the Basu (1997) model to capture the extent 
of accounting conservatism and firm-specific return variation to proxy for the 
quality of information environment, we find that conservatism is positively 
associated with the improvement of the corporate information environment in our 
sample of 43 countries. We also find that such an information role of conservatism is 
more pronounced in countries with weaker protection of private property rights, 
suggesting that conservatism substitutes for legal institutions in ensuring the quality 
of information environment. 
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1. Introduction 
Accounting information helps reduce information asymmetry among contracting parties of a 
firm and plays a crucial role in capital markets. Existing literature posits that earnings, as the most 
fundamental accounting information, are of higher quality when they are more conservative, 
implying that accounting conservatism improves a firm’s information environment (e.g., Ball, 
Kothari and Robin 2000; Ball, Robin and Wu 2003; Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Wang 2006). 
However, empirical evidence is scant on the relationship between the level of accounting 
conservatism and the quality of corporate information environment across countries. Drawing on a 
sample from the U.S. market, LaFond and Watts (2008) provide evidence that information 
asymmetry between corporate insiders and outside equity investors drives managers to adopt 
conservative accounting, indicating the information role of conservatism.1 However, they fail to 
detect that greater conservatism facilitates lowering information asymmetry, and thus do not 
provide direct evidence to support the information role of conservatism. 
We posit that the small variation in accounting conservatism across firms or industries within a 
given country (i.e., the U.S.) may partially explain why LaFond and Watts (2008) fail to directly 
detect the information role of conservatism (Bushman, Piotroski and Smith 2011). In response to 
LaFond and Watts’s (2008) argument that conservative financial reports are likely to generate a 
more informed capital market than the financial reports that include unverifiable information, our 
cross-country study attempts to fill in this research gap by examining the direct relationship 
between accounting conservatism and the quality of information environment.2  
Recent research shows that conservative accounting helps to improve contracting efficiency, 
and acts as a governance mechanism limiting managerial opportunism (e.g., Watts 2003; Ahmed,  
                                                          
1 LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that outside equity investors demand more conservative earnings as a means of 
mitigating agency problems. They show that changes in information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors 
lead to changes in accounting conservatism. 
2 A growing body of international accounting and finance literature reports that country-level institutions play a first-
order role in shaping financial reporting incentives (Ball et al. 2000; Ball et al. 2003; Bushman and Piotroski 2006; 
Bushman et al. 2011). Therefore, using an international dataset increases the probability of directly detecting the 
information role of conservatism. 
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Billings, Morton and Stanford-Harris2002; Holthausen and Watts 2001; Watts and Zimmerman 
1986).3 Building on this stream of research, we contend that conservative accounting, as part of a 
firm’s disclosure policies, facilitates the flow of firm-specific information from corporate insiders 
to outsiders. Following Basu (1997), accounting conservatism is defined as asymmetric recognition 
of economic gains and losses into earnings, and thus equals timeliness of loss recognition (TLR 
hereafter) minus timeliness of gain recognition (TGR hereafter). 
Prior studies suggest that TLR is much more important than TGR in determining accounting 
conservatism and its effects (e.g., Basu 1997; Ball, Kothari and Robin 2000; Francis and Martin 
2010; Armstrong, Guay and Weber 2010). It is expected that managers have economic incentives to 
voluntarily disclose gains (i.e., good news) and to suppress disclosing losses (i.e., bad news). 
Financial reporting rules such as TLR that commit managers to disclosing bad news in a timely 
manner result in a more complete disclosure environment that facilitates the flow of firm-specific 
information from corporate insiders to outsiders (Armstrong et al. 2010), and thus enhance the firm-
specific stock return variation our measure of corporate information environment.4 Therefore, we 
predict that accounting conservatism is positively associated with the quality of the corporate 
information environment. 
Drawing on 130,869 firm-year observations from 43 economies for the 1998–2008 period, our 
results show that accounting conservatism is positively associated with the corporate information 
environment. More importantly, the association between TLR and the corporate information 
environment is significantly positive, while results on the association between TGR and the 
                                                          
3 Watts (2003) and Holthausen and Watts (2001) argue that conservatism helps to address agency problems. Zhang 
(2008) documents that firms that apply more accounting conservatism experience faster debt covenant violations, thus 
“triggering the alarm” for borrowers earlier. Moerman (2008) shows that more conditionally conservative firms enjoy 
lower bid-ask spreads on the secondary loan markets. Ahmed et al. (2002) show that debt-holders view conservatism as 
a means of minimizing agency problems between debt-holders and shareholders, and thus accounting conservatism is 
negatively related to cost of debt. Ball, Bushman and Vasvari (2008) show that conservatism leads underwriters to hold 
a lower stake in issued loans. Altogether, these studies provide evidence suggesting that conservatism is an effective 
tool in reducing information asymmetry and monitoring managers’ behavior. 
4 Following Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) and others, we use firm-specific return variation to proxy for a firm’s 
information environment. Greater firm-specific return variation indicates more firm-specific information being 
impounded in stock prices, higher price informativeness, and thus a better information environment (Morck, Yeung and 
Yu 2000; Jin and Myers 2006). 
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corporate information environment are mixed, indicating that the TLR aspect of accounting 
conservatism is more important than TGR in facilitating the flow of firm-specific information from 
insiders to outside investors. Furthermore, we provide evidence that the positive relation between 
accounting conservatism and corporate information environment is significantly more pronounced 
in countries with weaker protection of private property rights. Our findings highlight the effective 
role of conservative accounting as a governance mechanism in enhancing the quality of a corporate 
information environment. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests, including 
alternative models for measuring conservatism, different measures for corporate information 
environment, and various proxies of investor protection. 
This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, accounting conservatism is 
an important dimension of the quality of corporate information environment (e.g., Ball et al. 2000; 
Ball et al. 2003; Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Wang 2006). However, to the best of our knowledge, 
there is no direct evidence to substantiate the information role of accounting conservatism. By 
documenting a positive association between accounting conservatism and the quality of information 
environment, our study lends support to the information role of accounting conservatism, and sheds 
light on recent accounting literature examining the consequences of conservatism. 
Second, our study employs an international dataset to explore the effects of accounting 
conservatism on information environment, an association that is difficult detect in a single-country 
setting. LaFond and Watts (2008) document that information asymmetry leads to more conservative 
financial reporting. However, probably due to the small variations of conservatism within a given 
country (Bushman et al. 2011; Bushman and Piotroski 2006), they fail to detect the effect of 
accounting conservatism on information asymmetry. Our study extends LaFond and Watts (2008) 
by demonstrating that accounting conservatism does improve a firm’s information environment, 
and thus helps to explain why information asymmetry could pressure managers to use accounting 
conservatism.  
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Third, our study stresses the important governance role of conservatism as a substitute for 
country-level legal institutions in efforts to ensure a high-quality information environment. Thus, in 
order to provide a better corporate information environment, managers can adopt conservative 
accounting—especially in countries where good property protection institutions are unavailable.The 
remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the research hypotheses, and 
Section 3 specifies the research design. Section 4 describes data and presents descriptive statistics. 
Our main empirical results are detailed in Section 5, and Section 6 reports the results of further tests. 
Section 7 presents robustness checks. Section 8 discusses research implications and limitations, 
with conclusions provided in Section 9. 
2. Hypothesis Development 
Accounting conservatism triggers the recognition of losses (i.e., bad news) in earnings when 
they are probable, but defers the recognition of gains (i.e., good news) until they are verifiable. 
Managers are expected to have economic incentives for voluntarily disclosing gains and 
suppressing losses for their own interests. Financial reporting rules such as TLR that commit 
managers to disclosing bad news in a timely manner result in a more complete disclosure 
environment that facilitates the flow of firm-specific information from corporate insiders to 
outsiders. We therefore predict that accounting conservatism and TLR are positively associated 
with the quality of information environment. Accounting conservatism is measured as the 
asymmetric timeliness of bad news versus good news recognition (Basu, 1997), and hence both 
TLR and TGR are reflected in our measure of conservatism. 
 The effect of TGR on price informativeness is expected to be relatively weak Under 
conservatism, the requirements for verifiability of gain recognition can have two opposing effects 
on a firm’s information environment. On one hand, highly verifiable gain information—the 
untimely recognition of gains (i.e., lower TGR)—constrains managers’ ability to overstate 
performance, and thus improves the information quality of gains. It can also discipline other sources 
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of information, especially when information is firm-specific, that are useful for investors’ decision-
making (Ball 2001; LaFond and Watts 2008). From this perspective, for the firms with lower TGR, 
investors have a greater ability to obtain more precise firm-specific information and to incorporate 
such information into stock prices, resulting in a more informative information environment. On the 
other hand, however, higher requirements for verifiability of gain recognition (lower TGR) may 
limit the flow of firm-specific earnings information from well-motivated insiders on gains that, 
though not yet fully realized, is valuable to outsiders. This is especially true for firms with 
substantial investment opportunities (Armstrong et al. 2010). From this perspective, lower TGR 
might cloud a firm’s information environment. Essentially, given the two opposing effects of TGR 
on stock price informativeness, the net effect presents an empirical question.5 
Combining the TLR and TGR aspects of conservatism, we predict that accounting 
conservatism is positively associated with stock price informativeness. Our analysis leads to the 
following hypotheses: 
H1: The quality of corporate information environment increases with accounting conservatism. 
H1a: The quality of corporate information environment increases with TLR. 
H1b: The quality of corporate information environment increases/decreases with TGR.  
Well-functioning legal institutions constrain insiders’ private control benefits by making 
wealth expropriation legally riskier and more expensive (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes et al. 2000; 
Nenova 2003; Leuz et al. 2003). Accordingly, in countries with strong legal institutions, insiders 
have limited economic incentive to overstate firm performance. This could weaken the role that 
accounting conservatism plays in constraining managers from suppressing realized losses and 
recognizing unrealized gains. Alternatively, in countries with weak protection of legal institutions 
where alternative sources of information (such as voluntary disclosure) are limited (Bushman et al. 
                                                          
5 In this study, the intent of our tests is solely to capture the net effect of TGR on price informativeness. Because the 
two opposing effects of TGR are entangled, we are unable to make a distinction between them. Determining how to 
separate the two different effects of TGR is beyond the scope of this study.   
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2004; Jin and Myers 2006), a more important role in facilitating the flow of firm-specific 
information from corporate insiders to outsiders is likely played by the provision of more useful 
(less exaggerated and timelier) accounting information through conservatism Therefore, the 
marginal effects of accounting conservatism on information environment are expected to be 
stronger in countries with poorly functioning legal institutions.6 
We focus on the legal institution of investors’ property rights. Morck et al. (2000) show that 
strong protection of property rights promotes informed arbitrage and affects the extent to which 
information is capitalized into stock prices. Prior studies suggest that to prevent outside investors’ 
interests from being expropriated, firm-level corporate governance mechanisms could substitute for 
country-level institutions (e.g., Durnev and Kim 2005; Fan and Wong 2005). Therefore, the role of 
accounting conservatism can be more important in eliciting informed stock trading, and in 
improving the corporate information environment in countries without strong property rights 
protection in place. 
The overall discussions as outlined above lead us to predict a stronger effect of accounting 
conservatism on the quality of information environment when legal institutions are weak. Therefore, 
our second hypothesis is stated as below: 
H2: The positive association between accounting conservatism and the quality of corporate 
information environment is more pronounced in countries with weaker protections of 
private property rights. 
H2a: The positive association between TLR and the quality of corporate information 
environment is more pronounced in countries with weaker protection of private property 
rights. 
                                                          
6 In countries with weak protection for legal institutions, however, firms rely less on public financing and, hence, rely 
less on accounting conservatism (Ball et al. 2000; Ball and Shivakumar 2005). To the extent that weak protection 
reduces outside investor demand for conservatism, it provides bias against finding our hypothesized results. 
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H2b: The positive/negative association between TGR and the quality of corporate information 
environment is more pronounced in countries with weaker protection of private property 
rights. 
3. Research Design 
3.1. Measuring information environment quality 
Following prior studies, our primary proxy of information environment is relative firm-specific 
stock return variation—that is, FRV, which is calculated using weekly stock trading data based on 
an expanded market model, as in Jin and Myers (2006). As shown below, the model regresses stock 
returns of firms on the local and U.S. market index returns of five periods (from week t-2 to t+2):7 
rj,t = αj + β1,j rm,t + β2,j [rUS,t +em,t] 
+ β3,j rm,t-1 + β4,j [rUS,t-1 +em,t-1]+ β5,j rm,t-2 + β6,j [rUS,t-2 +em,t-2] 
+ β7,j rm,t+1 + β8,j [rUS,t+1 +em,t+1] + β9,j rm,t+2 + β10,j [rUS,t+2 +em,t+2] +ξj,t  . (1) 
 
In the above equation, rj,t is the return on stock j in week t (in market m), rm,t and rUS,t are the 
primary local and U.S. market index returns, and em,t is the change in exchange rate against the U.S. 
dollar. Following Jin and Myers (2006), we add two lag and lead terms of market returns in the 
model to control any potential nonsynchronous trading problem. Stocks that trade for less than 
30 weeks during a particular year are excluded. Again following Jin and Myers (2006), if a 
country has fewer than 25 stocks with valid data in a year, we exclude the country for that year. 
The firm-specific return variation is estimated as the ratio of idiosyncratic volatility to total 
volatility. Given the bounded nature of R2, we conduct our tests using a logistic transformation of 
1-R2: 
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7 Our results are qualitatively the same if we alternatively use the two-factor model of Morck et al. (2000) that regresses 
firm stock returns on the contemporary local and U.S. market index returns. As mentioned, we prefer the expanded 
market model of Jin and Myers (2006) because the model includes two lag and lead terms of market returns to control 
for the potential nonsynchronous trading problem. 
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FRV measures firm-specific stock return variation relative to market-wide variation, or a lack 
of synchronicity with the market. A higher value of FRV indicates more firm-specific information 
impounded into the stock prices via trading by investors, and thus a more informative corporate 
environment (French and Roll 1986; Roll 1988; Morck et al. 2000; Jin and Myers 2006). 
Considering that firms in some countries are subject to more country-wide shocks than is the case 
for other countries (Fernandes and Ferreira 2009), we scale firm-specific stock return variation by 
the total variation in returns. Using the method proposed by Fernandes and Ferreira (2009), we also 
construct two variables, namely AFRV and ASRV, to measure the absolute firm-specific stock return 
variation and absolute systematic stock return variation, respectively. AFRV and ASRV are 
calculated as the natural logarithms of idiosyncratic volatility (σ2) and systematic volatility (R2) of 
Eq. (2). 
3.2. Model specification 
In this paper, accounting conservatism is measured as the incremental timeliness of bad news 
recognition over good news recognition (Basu, 1997). Following Bushman et al. (2011),8 we use 
the model below to capture the timeliness of good news recognition versus bad news recognition: 
NIit=b0+b1Dit+b2Rit+b3Dit*Rit+ξit (3) 
 
where NI is net income before extraordinary items, deﬂated by the beginning period of market 
capitalization. Rit is firm i's annual stock returns for the year ending three months after year t. D is 
an indicator variable equal to one if R is less than zero, and zero otherwise. 
The estimate b2 of the above regression measures TGR, and b3 measures the incremental 
timeliness of bad news recognition over good news recognition. The asymmetric timeliness 
coefficient b3 is used to measure the degree of accounting conservatism, which is of primary 
                                                          
8 Using firm-level investment decisions spanning 25 countries, Bushman et al. (2011) provide an established model for 
examining the consequences of accounting conservatism across countries. 
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interest in this study. TLR is measured by b2 + b3. 
To test H1, following a number of models, specifically those proposed by Bushman and 
Piotroski (2006) and Francis and Martin (2010), we expand the baseline Basu (1997) model in Eq. 
(3) by including the information environment variable (FRV) along with additional firm-level 
controls: 
NIj,t = β1 + β2Dj,t + β3Rj,t + β4Dj,t*Rj,t 
+ β5FRVj,t+1 + β6Dj,t*FRVj,t+1 + β7Rj,t*FRVj,t+1 + β8Dj,t*Rj,t*FRVj,t+1 
+ β9SIZEj,t + β10Dj,t*SIZEj,t + β11Rj,t*SIZEj,t + β12Dj,t*Rj,t*SIZEj,t 
+ β13LEVj,t+ β14Dj,t*LEVj,t + β15R*LEVj,t + β16 Dj,t*Rj,t*LEVj,t 
+ β17MBj,t + β18Dj,t*MBj,t + β19Rj,t*MBj,t + β20Dj,t*Rj,t*MBj,t 
+ β21LITj,t + β22Dj,t*LITj,t + β23Rj,t*LITj,t + β24Dj,t*Rj,t*LITj,t 
+ Industry, Country and Year Fixed Effects + ωj,t (4) 
where FRVt+1 is firm-specific stock return variation of year t+1 estimated from the international 
expended model that includes local and U.S. market index returns. We use four control variables, 
namely, firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), market-to-book ratio (MB), and litigation risk (LIT), plus 
their interactions with the three terms in the baseline Basu (1997) model. These control variables 
have been shown to be related to timely loss/gain recognition and conservatism (e.g., Basu, 1997; 
Watts, 2003; LaFond and Watts, 2008; Francis and Martin, 2010). SIZE is the natural log of total 
assets in million US dollars at the fiscal year end. LEV is the financial leverage measured as the 
sum of short- and long-term debts to total assets. MB is the market-to-book ratio. LIT is coded as 
one if a firm is in a litigious industry (SIC code: 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, 
and 7370), and zero otherwise. 
H1 predicts β8 to be significantly positive, and H1a predicts the sum of β7 and β8 to be 
significantly positive. H1b has no prediction on the sign of β7. 
To test H2, we regress the following model to detect the effects of private property 
rights on the association between accounting conservatism and firm-specific return variation: 
 
NIj,t = β1 + β2Dj,t + β3Rj,t + β4Dj,t*Rj,t + β5FRVj,t+1 + β6Dj,t*FRVj,t+1 
10 
 
+ β7Rj,t*FRVj,t+1 + β8Dj,t*Rj,t*FRVj,t+1 + β9GGI + β10Dj,t*GGI 
+β11Rj,t*GGI+ β12Dj,t*Rj,t*GGI + β13FRVj,t+1*GGI+ β14Dj,t*FRVj,t+1*GGI 
+ β15Rj,t*FRVj,t+1*GGI + β16Dj,t*Rj,t*FRVj,t+1*GGI+ β17SIZEj,t 
+ β18Dj,t*SIZEj,t + β19Rj,t*SIZEj,t + β20Dj,t*Rj,t*SIZEj,t + β21LEVj,t 
+ β22Dj,t*LEVj,t + β23R*LEVj,t + β24 Dj,t*Rj,t*LEVj,t + β25MBj,t 
+ β26Dj,t*MBj,t + β27Rj,t*MBj,t + β28Dj,t*Rj,t*MBj,t + β29LITj,t + β30Dj,t*LITj,t 
+ β31Rj,t*LITj,t + β32Dj,t*Rj,t*LITj,t 
+ Industry and Year Fixed Effects + ωj,t (5) 
 
 
where GGI is the good government index, a proxy for private property rights protection (as in 
Morck et al. (2002)). GGI is constructed as the sum of three indexes from La Porta et al. (1998): (1) 
government corruption; (2) the risk of expropriation of private property by the government; and 
(3) the risk of the government repudiating contracts (Morck et al. 2000). Such an approach of 
measurement causes the original values of GGI to be negatively skewed and highly concentrated 
within the range of 20–30, as shown in Table 1. Therefore, we transform the original GGI into a 
rank variable RKGGI.9 A higher rank value of RKGGI, therefore, indicates stronger property rights 
protection. 
4.   Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Our sample consists of listed companies from 43 countries outside the U.S.  Financial data and 
stock data are collected from Worldscope and Datastream, respectively. After eliminating country-
years with fewer than 30 initial observations, and deleting firm-years with outliers, the final sample 
consists of 130,869 firm-year observations (24,235 firms) from 43 countries for the period of 1998–
2008. 
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics by country. As shown in the second and third 
columns, the size of the country samples range from 58 firm-years (14 firms) for Luxembourg to 
30,684 firm-years (4,334 firms) for Japan. Similar to the previous studies (e.g., Jin and Myer 2006), 
                                                          
9 The results are quite similar when GGI is measured as a dummy variable indicating the strength of private property 
rights protection. 
11 
 
R2 is highest in China (0.44) and lowest in Australia (0.263), with a mean (median) of 0.327 (0.326) 
across our sample countries. As can be seen from the last column of Table 1, GGI shows certain 
variations across countries: Switzerland has the highest level of GGI (29.96), while Pakistan has the 
lowest (13.47). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics on the firm level, and provides the correlation 
matrix. Panel A of Table 2 reports the mean values of each variable, revealing the mean and median 
of R2 as 0.321 and 0.302, respectively. With respect to our main variable of interest, the mean 
(median) of FRV is 0.827 (0.839). Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Bushman and Piotroski 
2006), accounting earnings are negatively skewed and stock returns are positively skewed. 
Moreover, stock returns display greater volatility than accounting income, indicating that managers 
tend to smooth earnings. The mean (median) of SIZE is 5.320 (5.194). The average sample firm has 
a market-to-book ratio of 2.04 and leverage of 0.81. 
Panel B of Table 2 reports the correlation matrix among the firm-level variables. Net income 
(NI) is positively correlated with stock returns (R), providing the preliminary univariate evidence of 
timeliness of bad news recognition. Many other correlations are significant at the 1% level, and the 
signs of correlation coefficients are consistent with prior research. For example, firm-specific stock 
return variation (FRV) is negatively correlated with firm size (SIZE) and market-to-book ratio (MB), 
which is consistent with prior studies such as Ferreira and Laux (2007) and Fernandes and Ferreira 
(2008).  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
5. Primary Empirical Results 
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Our multivariate tests are estimated using an ordinary regression model. In all regressions, we 
report robust t-statistics after correcting for firm-clustered standard errors that are likely to be 
present in the panel data (Petersen 2009).10 
5.1 Empirical evidence of the association between accounting conservatism and information 
environment 
Table 3 summarizes the basic regression results that test the impact of accounting conservatism 
on corporate information environment (H1). We include the measure of information environment 
quality and firm-level control variables (firm size, leverage, market-to-book ratio, and litigation risk) 
identified in prior studies. Main regression results with and without control variables are reported in 
columns (2) and (3), respectively. 
As shown in column (1) of Table 3, the coefficient on D*R is significantly positive, 
indicating, in the overall, the existence of accounting conservatism in our 43 sample countries. 
More importantly, the coefficient for D*R*FRVt+1 interaction term is significantly positive 
(0.092, with p<0.01 in column (2); 0.053, with p<0.01 in column (3)), thus indicating that 
accounting conservatism is positively associated with firm-specific return variation, which is our 
key measure of information environment. The results are consistent with H1. However, the 
coefficient for R*FRVt+1 is significantly negative (-0.017) in column (2) but insignificant (-
0.002) in column (3), suggesting mixed results of the relation between TGR and information 
environment. Furthermore, the F-tests show that the sum of the coefficients for R*FRVt+1 and 
D*R*FRVt+1 is significantly positive (0.075, with p<0.01 in column (2); 0.052, with p<0.01 in 
column (3)), supporting H1a. 
                                                          
10 We also tried correcting for country or country-industry clustered standard errors. The results (untabulated) are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in the main tables. 
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Taken together, the empirical results in Table 3 show positive association between asymmetric 
timeliness of loss recognition and information environment, suggesting that accounting 
conservatism facilitates the incorporation of firm-specific information into stock prices and, hence, 
improves the corporate information environment. Moreover, the TLR aspect of accounting 
conservatism is more important than the TGR aspect of accounting conservatism in affecting firms’ 
information environment. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
5.2 Empirical evidence on how private property rights protection affects the association between 
accounting conservatism and information environment 
In this section, we present the results of tests of our second hypothesis (H2) that explores the 
role of country-level property rights protection on the association between accounting conservatism 
and information environment. We compare the information role of conservatism across countries 
based on the rank variable of good governance index RKGGI, and summarize the regression results 
in Table 4. 
Consistent with H1, D*R*FRVt+1 is significantly positive in relation to NI in both columns 
(0.152, with p<0.01 in column (1); 0.099, with p<0.01 in column (2)). More importantly, the 
coefficients for the interaction term on D*R*FRVt+1*RKGGI are significantly negative at the 5% 
level or above, thus suggesting that the effects of accounting conservatism on information 
environment are significantly more (less) pronounced in countries with weaker (stronger) 
protection for private property rights. The results for the TLR are also consistent with our 
expectation of the greater information role of conservatism in countries with weaker property rights 
protection.11 In combination, our results highlight the important governance role of conservatism as a 
substitute for legal institutions in ensuring a high-quality information environment, which is 
                                                          
11  Consistent with the TLR expectation in H2a, the sum of the coefficients on R*FRVt+1*RKGGI and 
D*R*FRVt+1* RKGGI is significantly negative in Table 4. The TGR expectation is less important, and we 
consistently find insignificant results regarding H2b (e.g., the insignificant coefficient on R*FRVt+1*RKGGI). 
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consistent with H2. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
6. Further Tests 
6.1 Testing conservatism’s effect on firm-specific and systematic return variation 
Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) argue that the total return variation of a firm’s stock consists of 
two parts: firm-specific return variation and systematic return variation. In this subsection, we 
follow Fernandes and Ferreira (2009), and disentangle the total stock return variation into firm-
specific return variation (AFRV) and systematic return variation (ASRV). We are then able to 
examine how accounting conservatism directly affects them. Unlike FRV, which is calculated as the 
firm-specific stock return variation divided by the total return variation, AFRV is the absolute return 
variation. H1 predicts that accounting conservatism is positively associated with AFRV, but has no 
prediction on the association between accounting conservatism and ASRV. The untabulated results 
indicate that accounting conservatism is positively associated with next-period firm-specific stock 
return variation, but it is negatively associated with next-period systematic stock return variation. 
Therefore, our results suggest that conservatism improves information environment not only 
because conservatism facilitates the flow of firm-specific information from corporate insiders to 
outside investors, but it also reduces investors’ exposure to market risk. 
6.2   Applying change models 
In our main tests, we examine the association between the current conservatism and the firm-
specific return variation of the next period. The model specifications assume that changes in 
conservatism lead to changes in the information environment. In this subsection, we use change 
models to further investigate how accounting conservatism can be associated with changes of price 
informativeness in three different periods: past period (t-1), current period (t), and future period 
(t+1). If it is the application of accounting conservatism that causes the improvement in a firm’s 
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information environment and not the reverse, we should observe that the change of firm-specific 
return variation during t and t+1 are positively associated with current-period accounting 
conservatism. However, such an association should not exist for the change of firm-specific return 
variation of period t-1. Briefly, our analysis shows that whereas conservatism is positively 
associated with the current- and next-period FRV increases, the effect of conservatism on the 
change of FRV in the lagged period is statistically insignificant. Overall, we provide evidence 
supporting our argument that the application of accounting conservatism leads to improvement of 
the information environment. 
7.   Robustness Checks 
7.1   Alternative measure of information environment 
Although firm-specific stock return variation is widely accepted in the literature as a proxy for 
the quality of a firm’s information environment, it is not used in this way without controversy. 
Limits to  arbitrage,  pricing  errors,  and  noisy  trading  could  also  result  in  firm-specific  return 
volatility. A more direct proxy for the information environment of stock trading is a measure based 
on informed stock trading volume. Following Fernandes and Ferreira (2008, 2009), we additionally 
employ the model developed by Llorente et al. (2002)12 to estimate informed stock trading. The 
untabulated results using informed stock trading are qualitatively unchanged. 
7.2   Causality analyses between change of price informativeness and change of accounting 
conservatism 
Another important concern is that our tests indicate only the association between accounting 
conservatism and firm-specific return variation, rather than revealing the causality between them, 
although our analyses applying the change models in Section 6.2 show that conservatism’s effect 
exists primarily in the future rather than in the past. To assuage this concern, we conduct further 
                                                          
12 The Llorente et al. (2002) model is as follows: rj,t = αj + γj rj,t-1 +θj rj,t-1 Vj,t-1 + ∂j,t, where rj,t is weekly stock return of 
firm j for week t, and Vj,t is weekly trading volume divided by number of shares outstanding. Following Fernandes and 
Ferreira (2008, 2009), we detrend volume by subtracting a 26-week moving average. 
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causality analysis between change of information environment and change of accounting 
conservatism. Specifically, we estimate an average coefficient of conservatism for each three-digit 
SIC industry year using the pooled cross-sectional Basu (1997) model, and then investigate the 
association of industry average change of FRV with change of the incremental coefficient on bad 
news. When we regress the change of FRV in different periods on the current-period change of 
conservatism, controlling for conservatism level in the lagged period, the results (untabulated) show 
that the current-period change of conservatism (ΔCONt) is positively and significantly associated 
with the change of FRV in the next period (ΔFRVt+1), but the association between ΔCONt and other-
period FRV changes (i.e., ΔFRVt-1 and ΔFRVt) is insignificant. In contrast, when the current-period 
change of conservatism is regressed on the different-period changes of FRV (i.e., ΔFRVt-1, ΔFRVt, 
and ΔFRVt+1), we find no significant results. Therefore, our causality analyses suggest that it is the 
increase of conservatism that leads to improvement of the information environment, not the reverse. 
7.3   Other robustness checks 
 We conduct several additional robustness checks. First, in addition to the investor protection 
proxy using GGI, we re-estimate the model using two alternative proxies of investors’ rights 
protection that recent studies have frequently used (e.g., Bushman and Piotroski 2006; McLean, 
Zhang and Zhao 2012; Peek, Cuijpers and Buijink 2010). One is a comprehensive investor 
protection variable, PROTECT, which captures both the letter of the law and the strength of law 
enforcement, and the other is a public enforcement index, PUBENF.13 Both proxies are from La 
Porta et al. (2006). Empirical results using the alternative measures of investor protection produce 
results consistent with our main test.  
                                                          
13 PROTECT is measured as the first principal component of Liability standard, Disclosure requirements, and an index 
of anti-director rights, and is meant to capture both the letter of the law and the strength of law enforcement. PUBENF 
is measured in terms of supervisor (regulatory agency) characteristics, rule-making powers, investigative powers, 
noncriminal sanctions, and criminal sanctions. Stronger investor protection exists when the supervisor has greater 
investigative authority, as well as the ability to punish firms and auditors that violate securities laws. These two proxies 
are related to our study because they capture the protection of outside investors’ rights regarding security trading and 
the enforcement of the security laws. 
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Second, although Basu (1997) regression as a baseline model is widely used in extant 
accounting literature (e.g., Bushman and Piotroski, 2006; LaFond and Watts, 2008; Francis and 
Martin, 2010), the number of variables used and interacted in the regression models raises the 
concern of a potential multicollinearity problem. To alleviate this concern, we demean the 
continuous variables (i.e., FRV, NI, R, SIZE, and MB) by subtracting the sample means from them 
and then repeating our main regression analyses (reported in Tables 3 and 4). The untabulated 
results under this demeaning approach are qualitatively similar to those in Tables 3 and 4, 
suggesting that it is unlikely that our findings are driven by the multicollinearity problem.14  
Third, an important concern in international studies is that a number of fundamental market-
level factors, such as legal origins, economy, and capital market development, could affect the 
empirical results. To ensure that our regression results are not driven by important but omitted 
market-level variables, we include several market-level control variables in our regressions to 
capture fundamentals of an economy: legal origins, gross domestic product per capita, and stock 
market capitalization. Our analysis shows that the findings are not sensitive to the inclusion of these 
market fundamental variables. 
Fourth, Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) argue that the beginning composition of equity value 
affects asymmetric timeliness measured over short horizons. Specifically, past timeliness of 
earnings with respect to returns influences future earnings timeliness over short periods, which 
might affect the results of Basu’s (1997) model. To mitigate the concern that a one-year Basu’s 
(1997) model might lead to biased results, we re-estimate our regression models using earnings and 
returns over two- and three-year periods. The (untabulated) results of replicating Tables 3 and 4 
using two- or three-year asymmetric timeliness measures are similar to those of the main tables. 
Finally, the data being used in our main test is for 43 countries, but is highly skewed in terms 
of the number of observations. To ensure that the results are not driven by the data issue, we 
                                                          
14 Our analyses show that, after demeaning the variables, the variance inflation factors (VIF) for all the variables are 
reasonably small, for example, smaller than 7. 
18 
 
exclude country-years with fewer than 100 observations, and reproduce Table 4. Our main results 
(untabulated) remain unchanged. 
8.   Implications and Limitations 
This study provides evidence that accounting conservatism plays an important role in 
facilitating the flow of firm-specific information from corporate insiders to outside investors, and 
thus helping to improve the corporate information environment. Our findings are in line with prior 
literature indicating that conservatism is not only an essential property of accounting that can, 
arguably, alleviate information asymmetry (LaFond and Watts, 2008), but is also a key mechanism 
that improves corporate governance efficacy and mitigates managerial opportunism (e.g., Ball 2001; 
Watts 2003; Francis and Martin 2010). The findings of this study imply that users of financial 
reports and standard-setting bodies for accounting need to pay closer attention to the information 
role of accounting conservatism. Our evidence supports the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) in its call for the increased and timely disclosure of financial accounting information. 
This position stands in opposition to the FASB’s view that this time-honored accounting principle, 
to a certain extent, limits the information role of financial statements in equity markets.  
Furthermore, this study indicates that the information role of conservative accounting is more 
pronounced in countries with poor protection of private property rights. Our findings imply that 
conservatism substitutes, at least to a certain extent, for legal protection of private property rights to 
ensure the quality of the corporate information environment. Therefore, in an environment with 
poor legal protection, outside stakeholders may resort to firm-level conservatism to be better 
informed about corporate insiders’ value-creation actions and agency behavior. 
Our results are robust to a series of sensitivity tests and regression specifications. However, we 
acknowledge that our reliance on a skewed data set in terms of the number of observations across 
the 43 countries constitutes the central limitation of this study.15 To the extent that the highly 
                                                          
15 For example, as shown in Table 1, the top seven (16%) countries account for 73,857 (56%) of the total observations. 
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skewed nature of the data matters in the context of our study, it provides potential bias in our 
findings. In addition, our reliance on the imperfect proxies for conservatism and information 
environment, especially for a cross-country sample, could be another limitation of this study. 
9.   Conclusions 
Our study examines how accounting conservatism affects the corporate information 
environment, and how country-level legal institutions influence this effect. Using 130,869 
observations from 43 countries for the period of 1998-2008, our results show that, on average, 
accounting conservatism improves the quality of the corporate information environment, and that 
this information role of conservative reporting is more pronounced in countries with weak legal 
protection for private property rights. We interpret our results as being consistent with the notion 
that users of accounting information benefit from the adoption of accounting conservatism, in that 
conservatism constrains the ability of corporate insiders to suppress bad news and overstate firm 
performance, thereby increasing the preciseness and timeliness of stock price incorporating 
management value-creation actions.  
Our study extends LaFond and Watts’s (2008) study by demonstrating that accounting 
conservatism does improve a firm’s information environment, and thus helps to explain why 
information asymmetry could drive managers to adopt accounting conservatism. Furthermore, by 
documenting a positive association between accounting conservatism and the improvement of the 
information environment, this study contributes to the recent literature on the consequences of 
conservative reporting. Our sensitivity tests suggest that our documented evidence is less likely to 
be driven by model bias or measurement errors. Overall, this study highlights the information role 
of accounting conservatism, especially in countries with weak legal protection for property rights. 
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Appendix: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition of variable 
FRV 
Firm-specific stock return variation. FRV is estimated from 
the international expanded model that includes local and 
U.S. market index returns 
△FRV The change of firm-specific stock return variation (FRV). 
AFRV The natural logarithm of the absolute firm-specific stock return variation.  
ASRV The natural logarithm of the absolute systematic stock return variation. 
NI 
Net income before extraordinary items, deflated by beginning year of 
market capitalization. 
R 
Annual market-adjusted stock returns beginning 9 months prior to fiscal 
year end. 
D 
Indicator variable for bad news, taking 1 if R is less than 0, and 0 
otherwise. 
SIZE 
Firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets in million US 
dollars at the end of the fiscal year. 
MB Market-to-book ratio. 
LEV 
Financial leverage, measured as the ratio of short- and long-term debts 
to total assets. 
LIT LIT is coded as one if a firm is in a litigious industry (SIC code: 2833-
2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 7370), and zero otherwise. 
GGI 
The Good Government Index. GGI is a proxy for private property rights 
protection, measured as the sum of government corruption, the risk of 
expropriation of private property by the government, and the risk of the 
government repudiating contracts. Data source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
RKGGI The rank of GGI. A higher rank value means stronger property rights. 
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TABLE 1 
Summary statistics for 43 countries 
The average R2 and firm-specific stock return variation (FRV) are estimated from the international expanded model that 
includes local and U.S. market index returns. Good Government Index (GGI) is a proxy for private property rights 
protection, measured as the sum of government corruption, the risk of expropriation of private property by the government, 
and the risk of the government repudiating contracts.  
 
Country NFirms NObs. R2 FRV GGI 
Argentina 63 343 0.358 0.652 16.84 
Australia 1,253 5,626 0.263 1.108 26.50 
Austria 115 566 0.289 0.994 27.86 
Belgium 149 877 0.299 0.940 27.93 
Brazil 239 1,133 0.352 0.679 20.24 
Canada 1,687 7,746 0.274 1.060 28.63 
Chile 115 710 0.338 0.743 19.60 
China 1,514 6,378 0.440 0.269 . 
Colombia 24 70 0.418 0.365 18.97 
Czech Republic 23 64 0.352 0.682 . 
Denmark 205 1,234 0.280 1.037 28.98 
Finland 149 932 0.300 0.916 28.82 
France 905 4,764 0.277 1.051 27.89 
Germany 931 4,645 0.272 1.073 28.60 
Greece 344 2,052 0.373 0.578 21.01 
Hong Kong 939 5,370 0.305 0.901 25.63 
Hungary 43 224 0.308 0.909 . 
India 920 4,074 0.351 0.671 18.44 
Indonesia 248 1,235 0.360 0.639 15.40 
Ireland 83 438 0.273 1.054 27.15 
Israel 203 974 0.363 0.650 24.12 
Italy 337 1,837 0.327 0.795 24.65 
Japan 4,334 30,684 0.314 0.855 27.88 
Luxembourg 14 58 0.333 0.792 . 
Malaysia 1,042 6,020 0.341 0.719 22.76 
Mexico 103 567 0.326 0.818 18.61 
Netherlands 224 1,244 0.312 0.875 29.33 
New Zealand 139 710 0.269 1.075 28.98 
Norway 226 983 0.329 0.776 29.59 
Pakistan 103 531 0.390 0.491 13.47 
Peru 53 282 0.290 1.011 14.92 
Philippines 150 821 0.352 0.674 12.94 
Poland 241 954 0.347 0.696 . 
Singapore 592 2,899 0.307 0.892 26.38 
South Africa 410 2,054 0.274 1.052 23.07 
South Korea 1,084 6,082 0.360 0.634 22.20 
Spain 164 981 0.308 0.895 25.30 
Sweden 429 2,296 0.318 0.835 28.98 
Switzerland 275 1,711 0.296 0.955 29.96 
Taiwan 1,288 6,861 0.399 0.455 25.13 
Thailand 488 2,458 0.345 0.719 20.17 
Turkey 231 1,295 0.421 0.360 18.13 
United Kingdom 2,156 10,086 0.270 1.079 28.44 
Total/Mean (43 countries) 24,235 130,869 0.327 0.827 23.78 
STD   0.044 0.213 5.04 
Q1   0.293 0.673 19.74 
Median  
 
0.326 0.818 25.22 
Q3  
 
0.352 0.975 28.31 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive statistics for and correlation coefficients between firm-level variables 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics. In Panel B, Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients are reported in the bottom left 
(top right). Except those marked in bold, all the correlation coefficients are significant at 1%. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics  
Variable N STD MEAN Q1 MEDIAN Q3 
R2t+1 130,869 0.139 0.321 0.215 0.302 0.411 
FRVt+1 130,869 0.690 0.827 0.360 0.839 1.293 
AFRVt+1 130,869 0.888 -6.308 -6.846 -6.221 -5.682 
ASRVt+1 130,869 1.043 -7.135 -7.751 -7.021 -6.397 
△FRVt+1 96,031 0.727 -0.078 -0.582 -0.074 0.425 
NI 130,869 0.261 0.022 0.003 0.052 0.103 
R 130,869 0.567 0.074 -0.259 -0.017 0.266 
SIZE 130,869 1.872 5.320 4.100 5.194 6.424 
LEV 130,869 1.517 0.810 0.037 0.295 0.885 
MB 130,869 2.287 2.040 0.786 1.335 2.359 
LIT 130,869 0.379 0.174 0 0 0  
Panel B: Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients 
 FRVt+1 AFRVt+1 ASRVt+1 △FRVt+1 NI R SIZE LEV MB LIT 
FRVt+1  -0.542 0.169 0.559 -0.061 -0.009 -0.274 -0.033 -0.083 0.005 
AFRVt+1 -0.539  0.756 -0.306 -0.207 -0.087 -0.132 -0.010 0.069 0.054 
ASRVt+1 0.144 0.702  0.085 -0.299 -0.111 -0.389 -0.037 0.009 0.071 
△FRVt+1 0.572 -0.302 0.084  -0.042 -0.026 -0.041 0.004 -0.061 0.012 
NI -0.070 -0.133 -0.210 -0.032  0.340 0.201 0.088 -0.030 -0.082 
R -0.003 0.015 0.016 -0.025 0.169  0.101 0.084 0.109 -0.046 
SIZE -0.280 -0.135 -0.377 -0.039 0.164 0.014  0.325 -0.040 -0.099 
LEV 0.015 0.017 0.031 0.007 -0.074 0.072 0.209  -0.303 -0.118 
MB -0.052 0.110 0.089 -0.049 -0.039 0.146 -0.102 -0.160  0.119 
LIT 0.005 0.056 0.070 0.011 -0.041 -0.024 -0.096 -0.095 0.092  
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TABLE 3 
OLS analyses of the association between firm-specific return variation and the asymmetric timeliness of loss 
recognition 
NIj,t = β1 + β2Dj,t + β3Rj,t + β4Dj,t*Rj,t  
+ β5FRVj,t+1 + β6Dj,t*FRVj,t+1 + β7Rj,t*FRVj,t+1 + β8Dj,t*Rj,t*FRVj,t+1  
+ β9SIZEj,t + β10Dj,t*SIZEj,t + β11Rj,t*SIZEj,t + β12Dj,t*Rj,t*SIZEj,t  
+ β13LEVj,t+ β14Dj,t*LEVj,t + β15R*LEVj,t + β16 Dj,t*Rj,t*LEVj,t  
+ β17MBj,t + β18Dj,t*MBj,t + β19Rj,t*MBj,t + β20Dj,t*Rj,t*MBj,t  
+ β21LITj,t + β22Dj,t*LITj,t + β23Rj,t*LITj,t + β24Dj,t*Rj,t*LITj,t + Fixed Effects + ωj,t .  
FRV is the firm-specific stock return variation. See Appendix for definitions of variables. The t-statistics are 
estimated with clustered standard errors at the firm level. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively (one-tailed test where sign is predicted; two-tailed test otherwise).  
 Sign (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Coeff. t-stat.  Coeff. t-stat.  Coeff. t-stat. 
Intercept  0.058*** 41.31  0.065*** 34.85  0.026* 1.80 
D  -0.007*** -3.49  -0.012*** -4.32  -0.044*** -5.20 
R  0.019*** 6.54  0.034*** 7.64  -0.039*** -3.29 
D*R  0.220*** 32.66  0.126*** 12.32  0.336*** 13.35 
FRVt+1     -0.010*** -5.07  0.005** 2.39 
D*FRVt+1     0.002 0.63  0.005* 1.71 
R*FRVt+1     -0.017*** -3.88  -0.002 -0.40 
D*R*FRVt+1 +    0.092*** 8.86  0.053*** 5.16 
SIZE        0.010*** 11.19 
D*SIZE        0.004*** 3.17 
R*SIZE        0.017*** 9.37 
D*R*SIZE        -0.054*** -13.02 
LEV        -0.017*** -8.65 
D*LEV        0.000 0.09 
R*LEV        0.005** 2.14 
D*R*LEV        0.069*** 6.22 
MB        -0.008*** -11.72 
D*MB        0.001 1.09 
R*MB        -0.003*** -3.92 
D*R*MB        -0.006** -2.19 
LIT        -0.021*** -5.77 
D*LIT        0.014*** 2.71 
R*LIT        -0.007 -1.07 
D*R*LIT        0.042*** 2.61 
F-test:          
R*FRVt+1 + D*R*FRVt+1  +    0.075*** 7.97  0.052*** 5.53 
Year Fixed Effects  NO   NO   YES  
Industry Fixed Effects  NO   NO   YES  
Country Fixed Effects  NO   NO   YES  
          
NObs.  130,869   130,869   130,869  
Adjusted R2 (%)  4.82   5.32   13.45  
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TABLE 4 
Private property rights protection and the association between firm-specific return variation and the asymmetric timeliness of loss 
recognition 
This table presents select coefficients and test statistics from estimations of the following model:  
NIj,t = β1 + β2Dj,t + β3Rj,t + β4Dj,t*Rj,t + β5FRVj,t+1 + β6Dj,t*FRVj,t+1 + β7Rj,t*FRVj,t+1 + β8Dj,t*Rj,t*FRVj,t+1 + β9RKGGI 
+ β10Dj,t*RKGGI + β11Rj,t*RKGGI + β12Dj,t*Rj,t*RKGGI + β13FRVj,t+1*RKGGI + β14Dj,t*FRVj,t+1*RKGGI  
+ β15Rj,t*FRVj,t+1*RKGGI + β16Dj,t*Rj,t*FRVj,t+1*RKGGI + β17SIZEj,t + β18Dj,t*SIZEj,t + β19Rj,t*SIZEj,t  
+ β20Dj,t*Rj,t*SIZEj,t + β21LEVj,t+ β22Dj,t*LEVj,t + β23R*LEVj,t + β24 Dj,t*Rj,t*LEVj,t + β25MBj,t + β26Dj,t*MBj,t  
+ β27Rj,t*MBj,t + β28Dj,t*Rj,t*MBj,t + β29LITj,t + β30Dj,t*LITj,t + β31Rj,t*LITj,t + β32Dj,t*Rj,t*LITj,t + Fixed Effects + ωj,t   
FRV is the firm-specific stock return variation. Private property rights protection is proxied as the Good Government Index, which is 
measured in rank (RKGGI). Higher RKGGI means stronger property rights. See Appendix for definitions of variables. The t-statistics 
are estimated with clustered standard errors at the firm level. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively (one-tailed test where sign is predicted; two-tailed test otherwise).  
 Sign 
(1)  (2) 
 Coeff. t-stat.  Coeff. t-stat. 
Intercept  0.116*** 17.84  0.107*** 7.20 
D  -0.049*** -4.53  -0.072*** -5.74 
R  0.100*** 8.00  0.005 0.28 
D*R  0.012 0.39  0.243*** 6.38 
FRVt+1  0.001 0.20  0.007 1.09 
D*FRVt+1  0.032*** 2.84  0.028** 2.49 
R*FRVt+1  -0.015 -1.13  -0.007 -0.57 
D*R*FRVt+1 + 0.152*** 4.38  0.099*** 2.88 
RKGGI  -0.002*** -7.82  -0.002*** -10.29 
D*RKGGI  0.001*** 3.77  0.001*** 3.03 
R*RKGGI  -0.003*** -6.80  -0.002*** -4.44 
D*R*RKGGI  0.006*** 5.48  0.005*** 3.95 
FRVt+1*RKGGI  0.000 -1.64  0.000 -0.63 
D*FRVt+1*RKGGI  -0.001*** -3.13  -0.001** -2.34 
R*FRVt+1*RKGGI  0.000 0.88  0.000 1.01 
D*R*FRVt+1*RKGGI - -0.003*** -2.87  -0.002** -1.84 
SIZE     0.009*** 10.15 
D*SIZE     0.004*** 2.72 
R*SIZE     0.019*** 9.78 
D*R*SIZE     -0.058*** -13.63 
LEV     -0.016*** -8.00 
D*LEV     0.000 -0.03 
R*LEV     0.004* 1.67 
D*R*LEV     0.067*** 6.02 
MB     -0.007*** -10.26 
D*MB     0.002 1.43 
R*MB     -0.003*** -3.70 
D*R*MB     -0.005 -1.50 
LIT     -0.023*** -5.84 
D*LIT     0.014** 2.54 
R*LIT     -0.005 -0.64 
D*R*LIT     0.034** 2.01 
F-test:       
R*FRVt+1 + D*R*FRVt+1  + 0.137*** 4.28  0.091*** -2.49 
R*FRVt+1*RKGGI + D*R*FRVt+1*RKGGI - -0.003*** -2.75  -0.002* -1.58 
Year Fixed Effects  NO   YES  
Industry Fixed Effects  NO   YES  
Country Fixed Effects  NO   NO  
       
NObs.  123,191   123,191  
Adjusted R2 (%)  6.39   13.59  
 
